A decentralized interlocking system is proposed that assigns a unit to each track circuit and wires the units according to the track topology to achieve the function required of the entire system. The functions of each unit are represented by monotonic logic functions. The units are characterized in that they themselves can accomplish fail-safe error characteristics. The system consists of safety-related and non-safety related functional parts. The control requirements of signal aspects and switches are assigned to the non-safety-related parts, and the safety-related parts perform safety confirmation processing to judge whether or not the requirements are acceptable. This separation and the introduction of duality conversion help to achieve the safety confirmation desired of the interlocking system by the monotonic logic functions.
Method for Constructing Decentralized Interlocking System
Operating on Per-Track-Circuit Basis
Introduction
The interlocking system proposed in this paper is an autonomous interlocking system that assigns a unit to each track circuit and wires the units according to the track topology to achieve the function required of the entire system. The functions of each unit are represented by monotonic logic functions. The units are characteristic in that they themselves can accomplish fail-safe error characteristics.
The processing procedure of conventional interlocking systems consists of the following steps.
Step 1 (confirmation of competing routes): Confirmation of the fact that no competing routes are set for the route to be established.
Step 2 (control of branch direction): Diversion control of route-related switches in the desired direction.
Step 3 (interlock control): Maintenance of the branch condition and prohibition of setting of competing routes. The above processing has been traditionally configured by using the centralization concept that control should be performed based on the information of the entire line.
Safety control comes in two ways: self-confirmation interlock and mutual-confirmation interlock. The mutualconfirmation interlock is a control pattern that permits the control output to be produced for one of two controlled objects as long as the control output is not produced for the other controlled object. The function required of the interlocking system includes this mutual-confirmation interlock. The mutual-confirmation interlock is easy to configure when all of the controlled objects are centralizedly processed. Since the objects to be controlled or checked vary in conditions from station to station, however, it is necessary to design the interlocking function for the individual stations.
The design of interlocking devices depends on the layout of station signaling equipment, or switches, track circuits and signals. The authors have studied the possibility of preparing functional elements as units for signals and connecting the functional units according to field wiring to perform the required function (1) , (2) . To ensure the autonomy of the units against failure, it is necessary that they should individually have fail-safe error characteristics. To achieve the fail-safe error characteristics by using the asymmetric error characteristics, it is only necessary to realize the unit function by monotonic logic functions. The mutual-confirmation interlock, however, includes NOT operations and cannot be realized by the monotonic logic function.
The authors have studied an interlocking system by diving it into safety-related parts and non-safety-related parts and accomplishing it as a hybrid configuration of the safety-related parts and non-safety-related parts. In the interlocking system, the safety-related parts only judge whether or not action should be initiated, and the nonsafety-related parts are entrusted to initiate action. The control requirements of signal aspects and switches are assigned to the non-safety-related parts, and the safetyrelated parts perform safety confirmation processing to judge whether or not the requirements are acceptable. This separation and the introduction of duality conversion described later help to achieve the mutual-confirmation interlock in the interlocking system by the monotonic logic functions. Chapter 2 shows safety control characteristics for the functions required of the entire line. The functions of the safety-related parts are classified into self-confirmation interlock and mutual-confirmation interlock. Chapter 3 clarifies the preconditions for the requirements of the interlocking functions and demonstrates the possibility of realizing the mutual-confirmation interlocking function by monotonic logic through introduction of duality transformation.
Modeling of Interlocking Function
The simplified model (called the Type 0 model) whose function is restricted is described first. The Type 0 model does not treat overrun and clearance. The practical model (called the Type 1 model) that is an extension of the Type 0 model and capable of handling overrun and clearance is described next.
1 Type 0 model
An example of the Type 0 model is shown in Fig. 1 . DN1T, 11AT, 11BT, 1RAT, and 1RBT are track circuit sections. The track circuit sections 11AT and 11BT include the branches 11A and 11B, respectively. 1DN, 1RA, 1RB, 4R, and 5R are proceed permission control means (signal lights). The route permitted by 1RA starts at DN1T and runs from 11AT to 1RAT. The route permitted by 1RB starts at DN1T and runs from 11AT through 11BT to 1RBT.
The preconditions for the running routes to be covered by the Type 0 model are described below.
a ) The running route is divided into two or more track circuits and does not allow the presence of two or more trains in a track circuit section (block system). b ) One proceed permission means (signal light) corresponds to one route and is installed at the departure point of the route (or at the exit of the track circuit section). Up to two proceed permission means can be installed in one position. No proceed permission means is installed at the exit of the track circuit section that contains a switch. The arrival point of the route is up to the position where another proceed permission means is installed. d ) The proceed permission means notifies of proceed permission and proceed prohibition (Multiple-stage permissive speed is not described here).
e ) When notified of proceed prohibition, the train stops in the track circuit section (No overrun is assumed to occur).
f ) Once informed of proceed permission, the train is not guaranteed to stop in the track circuit section when the notification is later changed to proceed prohibition. Judgment that the train has stopped in the track circuit section is made by confirming that the train remains in the track circuit section after passage of the specified time (or that the train has not proceeded to the next track circuit section). If the train has not yet reached the track circuit section, it will certainly stop in the track circuit section.
g ) The maximum number of switches that can be included in one track circuit section is one (The case in which one track circuit section has multiple switches is not described here).
h ) Trains present in different track circuit sections do not interfere with each other (They are assumed to have sufficient clearance).
Assuming that the train notified of proceed permission runs in the route without colliding with another train and derailing, the conditions for generating proceed permission in the Type 0 model can be represented as follows: P1: The switch comprising the route is operated in the desired direction to establish the route. P2: The switch comprising the route is locked in the selected condition. P3: There is no other train on the established route. P4: There is no other train to proceed to the established route.
Assuming that there occur no train collision and derailment when the switch diverts the train after having been notified of diversion permission, the conditions for generating the diversion permission to the switch are as follows: A1: No train is present in the track circuit section that includes the switch. A2: No train proceeds to the track circuit section that includes the switch. 
2 Type 1 model
Of the preconditions for the Type 0 model, the overrun preconditions d) and e) and the clearance precondition h) are relaxed for the Type 1 model as follows:
d') The proceed permission means notifies of proceed permission and proceed prohibition. The proceed permission comes in two ways: permission that restricts the permissive speed (warning aspect) and permission that does not restrict the permissive speed.
e') When notified of proceed prohibition, the train is not guaranteed to stop in the track circuit section. The overrun range is one track circuit section, including the adjacent switch (The case in which the overrun range covers two or more track circuit sections is not described). If its speed is restricted, the train stops in the track circuit section. Once notified of proceed permission without speed restriction, the train is not guaranteed to run with speed restriction after the notification has been changed to proceed permission with speed restriction.
h') When two track circuit sections, including switches, are adjacent to each other, there is no guarantee that the trains present in the different track circuit sections will not interfere with each other. The trains present in the two sections adjacent to another section do not interfere with each other. The train present in a section without a switch does not interfere with the train present in a section with a switch.
An example of overrun is shown in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 , the train that has run along the route 1RA that ends in the section 1RAT cannot stop in the section 1RAT even if prohibited to proceed by the proceed permission control signal 4R, but is likely to proceed to the section 14T. The train overruns, but will certainly stop in the section 14T. The overrun section for the route 1RB that ends in the section 1RBT is 13B.
An example of clearance is shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , the converging route for the track circuit sections including switches is 3, and the diverging routes are 1 and 2. When the sides 1 and 3 of the section 13BT are connected, the train present in the section 13BT interferes with the train present on the route 2 in the section 14T. When the sides 1 and 3 of the section 14T are connected, the train present in the section 14T interferes with the train present on the route 2 in the section 14T. Generation of proceed permission by consideration of overrun corresponds to confirmation of not only the current route but also the succeeding route. The conditions for generating proceed permission with respect to the precondition e') of the Type 1 model are shown with respect to the conditions P1 to P4 of the Type 0 model as follows: PO1: The switch comprising the overrun range is operated in the desired direction to establish the overrun route. PO2: The switch comprising the overrun range is locked in the selected condition. PO3: There is no other train in the overrun range. PO4: There is no other train to proceed to the overrun range.
Generation of proceed permission by consideration of clearance corresponds to confirmation of not only the current route but also the area surrounding the current route. The conditions for generating proceed permission with respect to the precondition h') of the Type 1 model are shown with respect to the conditions P3 to P4 of the Type 0 model as follows: PC3: There is no other train in the interference range. PC4: There is no other train to proceed to the interference range.
When the route is established by restriction of the precondition e'), no proceed permission is actually generated for the other routes that use the sections including the same switch because the switch is operated in the desired direction. If the route establishment confirmation conditions P1 to P4 hold, therefore, the condition PC4 holds. The conditions for generating diversion permission to the switch in the Type 1 model are the same as the conditions A1 and A2 of the Type 0 model.
The conditions for generating permission in safetyrelated control can be classified in the following two ways:
Self-confirmation interlock: If the permission is generated when the conditions are satisfied, a hazardous event occurs.
Mutual-confirmation interlock: A hazardous event occurs when two permissions are simultaneously generated, but safety is assured as long as either permission alone is generated. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the conditions P1 to P4, PO1 to PO4, PC3 and PC4, and A1 and A2. 
Method of Realizing Decentralized Interlocking System

1 Separation into safety-related parts and nonsafety-related parts
The requirements for autonomously accomplishing the required functions of a decentralized interlocking system are described below. The output means of the conventional centralized interlocking system are assumed to be also used for the decentralized interlocking system.
( 1 ) A straight or branch path unit is assigned to a track circuit section. The signal lines for the signals exchanged between the units are connected according to the track topology in the station premises to achieve the logic functions that satisfy the proceed permission generation conditions P1 to P4 and diversion permission generation conditions A1 and A2 described in chapter 2. The logic functions to be achieved correspond to the functions required of the entire track topology. Based on the signals exchanged between the adjacent units, the control state of the other units is recognized to achieve the functions required of the entire track topology.
( 2 ) The straight path unit controls the proceed permission means. More specifically, it performs the lighting control of the proceed permission means installed at the exit of the track circuit section (or at the departure point of the route). Relays whose contacts do not fail stuck at on (referred to as HR relays) are used for lighting control. The straight path unit is equipped with such fail-safe characteristics that when it fails, it does not erroneously energize the HR relay, although it must no do so.
( 3 ) The branch path unit performs the diversion control of the switch. More specifically, it performs the diversion control of the switch installed in the track circuit section. A relay (referred to as the WLR relay) is used to lock the switch in the selected condition. The branch path unit is equipped with such fail-safe characteristics that when it fails, it does not erroneously energize the WLR relay, although it must no do so. A stuck-at-on failure is assumed for the WRL relay contacts. When the switch is operated in the desired direction and the WRL relay contacts are turned off, the switch is assumed to be capable of maintaining the selected condition.
A safety-related control system should be separated into the safety-related parts that are required to have failsafe error characteristics and the non-safety-related parts that are not required to have fail-safe error characteristics. If the safety-related parts are realized with the fail-safe error characteristics, they are separated from the non-safetyrelated parts according to the configuration of Fig. 4 . The monitor circuit performs the safety-related functions. The programmable logic controller (PLC) performs the nonsafety-related functions. The monitor circuit consists of the safety confirmation circuit, AND gate, and output circuit. The safety confirmation circuit detects the state of the controlled object and generates a logic 1 output signal when a safety indicating event is produced. The AND gate ANDs the signal from the safety confirmation circuit and the operation command signal from the PLC (logic 1 for the presence of the command) and transmits the ANDed result to the output circuit. When the safety indicating event disappears (or a hazardous event occurs), the output signal from the safety confirmation circuit disappears and goes logic 0, and the output circuit ceases to generate energy, irrespective of whether or not the PLC command signal is generated. Table 2 shows the functional division of the entire control system when the same input and out- Table 2 Correspondence between decentralized configuration and relay-type centralized configuration (separation into safety-related parts and non-safety-related parts) Fig. 5 Configuration of decentralized interlocking system based on Fig. 4 put devices as used in the conventional relay system are assumed to be used. The configuration of the decentralized interlocking system based on Fig. 4 is shown in Fig. 5 . The characteristics of the system of Fig. 5 are as described below.
( 1 ) The safety-related parts consist of straight and branch path units and wiring between the units. They guarantee the satisfaction of the proceed permission and diversion permission generation conditions (interlock logic in Table 1 Table 1 of chapter 2 must be realized by the propagation of the signals between the units. The mutual-confirmation interlock, however, involves NOT operations, which are not monotonic logic operations. In this condition, the signals between the units cannot be provided with the fail-safe error characteristics (how to make the signals between the units fail-safe is described in chapter 3.2).
( 2 ) The non-safety-related parts consist of a PLC, a communication device attached to each unit, and communication lines between the PLC and communication device groups. They control the signal lights, specify the diversion direction of the switches, and diagnose the units for failure (as indicated by the italic letters in Fig. 5 ).
( 3 ) In the straight path unit, the safety-related parts permit the associated signal lights to turn on when it is safe to display a proceed aspect. When the turn-on command is transmitted from the PLC through the communication device, the signal lights display a proceed aspect.
( 4 ) In the branch path unit, the safety-related parts permit the switch to operate when it is safe to release the switch. When the divert command is transmitted from the PLC through the communication device, the switch operates.
2 Realization of mutual-confirmation interlock by signals propagated between units
Suppose such fail-safe characteristics that the signal fails to logic 0, but not to logic 1. When binary mono- Fig. 6 Conversion to dual signal tonic logic operations (AND, OR, self-hold and on-delaytimer (3) have fail-safe characteristics, the combination thereof also has fail-safe characteristics. The mutualconfirmation interlock shown in Table 1 of chapter 1 includes NOT operations, which are not monotonic logic operations. For this reason, binary signals in one line are converted by dual operations to binary signals in two lines to make logic operations, including NOT operations, monotonic logic. Figure 6 shows dual-signal conversion. In Fig. 6 , input x is converted to two-line binary signal (X, X'). X and X' do not simultaneously go 1 due to a conversion error. Dotted-line arrows indicate conversion errors. Input x = 1 is converted to one of (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0). Input x = 0 is converted to either of (0, 1) and (0, 0). Input x = 0 is not erroneously converted to (1, 0) or to the same conversion result as that of x = 1.
Assume that the logic function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) of the binary input x1, . . . , xn is monotonic for the inputs x2 to xn but for x1. The dual signal conversion of the input x1 to (X1, X1') as shown in Fig. 6 allows the following representation.
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = X1' · f(0, x2, ..., xn) + X1· f(1, x2, ..., xn)
(1) If f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = 0 when x1 = 1, the function f can be converted to the monotonic function F, or f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = X1' · f(0, x2, ... , xn). The monotonic logic function g(x1, x2, ..., xn) of the binary input can be represented by g(x1, x2, ..., xn) = g(X1, x2, ..., xn) after the dual conversion. When f(x1, x2, ..., xn) and g(x1, x2, ... , xn) have exclusive logic relations with x1 or when f(0, x2, ..., xn) · g(1, x2, ..., xn) = 0 and f(1, x2, ..., xn) · g(0, x2, ..., xn) = 0 are both satisfied, the following exclusive logic relations hold for the functions F(X1', x2, ..., xn) and g(X1, x2, ..., xn) after the dual conversion of x1.
F(0, x2, ..., xn) · g(1, x2, ..., xn) = 0 when x1 = 1(X1' = 0, X1 = 1) (2.a) F (1, x2, . .., xn) · g(0, x2, ..., xn)= 0 when x1 = 0(X1' = 1, X1 = 0) (2.b) F(X1', x2, ..., xn) and g(X1, x2, ..., xn) are monotonic functions, and the exclusive logic relations required by the mutual-confirmation interlock can be realized by monotonic logic. Figure 7 shows the signals between the units used in this configuration (These signals between the units correspond to the Type 0 model. The signals between the units that correspond to the Type 1 model are described later). The signals described below are exchanged between the adjacent units. Based on these signals, the control state of the other units is recognized to accomplish the functions required of the entire track topology.
Proceed permission signal: A signal that permits the signal lights to display a proceed aspect at the departure point of the route. It is transmitted from the unit at the arrival point of the route through the units along the route to the unit at the departure point of the route (as indicated by the in Fig. 7 ). This is equivalent to the confirmation result of the permission generation conditions P1 to P3 and A1 in the Type 0 model described in chapter 2.
Non-entry guarantee signal: A signal that permits the switch to be released. It is transmitted from the unit at the departure point of the route, or from the branch path unit to control another switch, through the units along the route to the branch path unit to control the switch (as indicated by the arrow → in Fig. 7 ). This is equivalent to the confirmation result of the permission generation conditions P4 and A2 in the Type 0 model described in chapter 2. It is clear that the condition under which the non-entry guarantee signal is transmitted to the branch path unit in three directions from the adjacent units signifies the absence of a train proceeding to the branch path section. Figure 8 shows the relationship between the two signals between the units described above and the dual conversion shown in Fig. 6. Figure 8 (a) shows the dual conversion in the straight path unit. As shown in Fig. 8 (a) , the non-entry guarantee signal generated in the straight path unit is realized by monotonic logic. In straight path unit, lighting command ia from the PLC is subjected to dual conversion. As shown in Table 2 , the lighting command is handled as non-safety-related. When the lighting command ia is unintentionally generated, the signal lighting control output is generated if the signal lighting condition (g1(Ia, ...) = 1) holds. The non-entry guarantee signal is not generated. When the lighting command is unintentionally generated, the non-entry guarantee signal is generated if the condition (f1(Ia', ...) = 1) holds. The signal lighting control output is not generated. When the signal lights turn on, the non-entry guarantee signal is not transmitted to the adjacent unit. When the non-entry guarantee signal is transmitted, the signal lights are not turned on. This is due to the exclusive logic relation g1(Ia, ...) · f1(Ia', ...) = 0. Figure 8 (a) shows the non-entry guarantee signal gen- Table 1 . Figure 8 (b) shows the dual conversion in the branch path unit. As shown in Fig. 8 (b) , the proceed permission signal generated in the branch path unit is realized by monotonic logic. In the branch path unit, the WLR contact output is subjected to dual conversion. When the WLR relay make contacts fail stuck at on, the diversion permission signal continues to be generated. The proceed permission signal is not generated. When the WRL relay break contacts fail stuck at on, the proceed permission signal is generated if the condition (f2(Y', ...) = 1) holds. The diversion permission signal is not generated. When the switch can be operated to divert the train, the proceed permission signal is not transmitted to the adjacent unit. When the proceed permission signal is transmitted, the switch cannot be operated to divert the train. Figure 8 (b) shows the proceed permission signal generation conditions in relation to the mutual-confirmation interlock condition P3 shown in Table 1 .
Here, it is shown that the conditions under which the proceed permission signal is transmitted from the arrival point of the route to the departure point are equivalent to the four accident avoidance conditions P1 to P4 of the Type 0 model. Let the section L k T be the arrival point and the section L 1 T be the departure point, and consider the route L (1k) where the train runs in the sequence of The conditions under which the proceed permission signal transmitted from the arrival section L k T reaches the departure section L 1 T may be expressed by the following Eq. (4) according to the four accident avoidance conditions P1 to P4 of the Type 0 model. The branch path unit assigned to each branch path section L i T is assumed to transfer the proceed permission signal to the adjacent unit in the open direction when T i · Y' i = 1, and the straight path unit assigned to the arrival section L k T is assumed to generate the proceed permission signal when A k · T k = 1. Fig. 9 Example of application to 8 routes Figure 9 shows the decentralized interlocking system to be applied to the track topology that includes a common passing track. As shown in Fig. 9 (a) , the system consists of 14 track circuits, 8 signals (8 routes) and 6 switches, and requires no consideration to be paid to overrun and clearance. The combination of switch operation directions prevents most of the routes from standing in an exclusively competitive relation, except that the route permitted by the signal 1RB and the route permitted by the signal 6LB are in a competitive relation. The track topology of Fig. 9 (a) consists of eight straight path units and six branch path units, as shown in Fig. 9 (b) . Figure 10 shows the configuration of the route permitted by the signal 1RB and the flow of control when the signal 1RB lights. The operations in Fig. 10 are numbered for convenience's sake, but occur at almost the same time. Figure 10 (a) shows the flow of switch operation. The proceed permission signal is transmitted from the 1RAT unit at the arrival point of the route 1RA through the 11AT unit to the DN1T unit. The signal 1RA can turn on its lights. The non-entry guarantee signals from the DN1T and 1RAT units and from the 11BT unit are propagated to the 11AT unit. The switch 11A can operate. The 11A diversion command causes the disappearance of the proceed permission signal propagated to the 1RAT unit and changes the signal 1RA to the lighting prohibited condition. Figure 10 (b) shows the flow of switch operation confirmation. When the diversion operation of 11A and 11B is confirmed, the proceed permission signal is transmitted from the 1RB2T unit at the arrival point of the route 1RB through the 1RB1T, 11BT and 11AT units to the DN1T unit. The signal 1RB can turn on its lights. Figure 10 (c) shows the flow of 1RB lighting and switch lock. When the signal 1RB turns on its lights at a lighting command, the non-entry guarantee signal transmitted from the DN1T unit disappears, and the non-entry guarantees signal to the 11AT, 11BT, 1RB1T and 1RB2T units sequentially disappear in that order. The switches 11A and 11B cannot operate to divert the trains.
3 Application examples
4 Expansion to Type 1 model 4. 1 Overrun
To meet the proceed permission generation conditions P1 to P4 when overrun is taken into account as shown in Table 1 of chapter 2, the following signals between the units are added by extending the proceed permission signal and non-entry guarantee signal shown in the Type 0 model. Overrun guarantee signal: A signal that permits a proceed aspect without speed restriction at the departure point of the route. It is transmitted from the unit in the overrun section at the arrival point of the route through the units along the route to the unit at the departure point of the route. After confirming the reception of the signal, the unit at the departure point of the route can generate the permission signal for the proceed aspect without speed restriction. The proceed permission signal of the Type 0 model is equivalent to a signal that guarantees that the train can proceed regardless of the permissive speed. The overrun guarantee signal is equivalent to a signal that guarantees that the train can proceed without speed restriction.
Speed restriction signal: A signal that guarantees that the train can stop in the track circuit section at the arrival point of the route. It is generated when the unit at the departure point of the route notifies the train of an aspect with speed restriction or a stop aspect. It is transmitted from the unit at the departure point of the route to the unit at the arrival point of the route. After confirming the reception of the signal, the unit at the arrival point of the route generates the non-entry guarantee signal to the unit in the overrun section of the route. The non-entry guaran- tee signal of the Type 0 model is equivalent to a signal that guarantees that the train does not enter the track circuit section despite the permissive speed. The speed restriction signal is equivalent to a signal that guarantees that the train does not enter the track circuit section if its speed is restricted. Figure 11 shows the propagation of the abovementioned signals for overrun in the route 1RB (overrun in the section 13BT) shown in Fig. 10. In Fig. 11 , the overrun guarantee signal generated from the 13BT unit transmitted along the route 1RB through the 1RB2T, 1RB1T, 11BT units, and 11AT to the DN1T unit at the departure point of the route. The speed restriction guarantee signal generated from the DN1T unit is transmitted along the route 1RB through the 11AT, 11BT, and 1RB1T units to the 1RB2T unit at the arrival point. Based on this signal, the 1RB2T unit generates the non-entry guarantee signal to the 13BT unit in the overrun section.
4. 2 Clearance
To meet the proceed permission generation conditions PC3 and PC4 when clearance is taken into account as shown in Table 1 of chapter 2, the following signal between the units is added by extending the proceed permission signal and non-entry guarantee signal shown in the Type 0 model. Clearance confirmation signal: A signal that guarantees that no train is present in the interference region in the track circuit section that includes a branch path. After confirming the reception of this signal, the branch path unit propagates the proceed permission signal along the route. In the example of Fig. 3 , the condition under which no train is present in the side 2 of the section 14T (no train is present in the section 14T or the sides 1 and 3 are connected) is confirmed. The clearance confirmation signal is then transmitted from the 14T unit to the 13BT unit. Figure 12 shows the propagation of the clearance confirmation signal through the route 6LB (sections UP15 to 13AT to 13BT to 1RB2T to 1RB1T) shown in Fig. 10 (the interference sections are 13BT and 14T). In Fig. 12 , the proceed permission signal generated from the 1RB1T unit at the departure point of the route 6LB is transmitted along the route 6LB through the 1RB2T, 13BT, and 13AT units to the UP1T unit at the departure point. The 13BT unit confirms the clearance guarantee signal transmitted from the 14BT unit and relays the proceed permission signal.
Conclusions
A railway signal interlocking system is functionally Fig. 12 Signal between units for clearance confirmation divided into safety-related parts and non-safety-related parts. A decentralized interlocking system of the unit type that depends on field equipment for processing is proposed. A safety system can be functionally simplified if its truly safety-related parts are narrowed down, and can be often realized by the combination of "functions of good prospect". If the safety-related functions of an interlocking system are narrowed down, "functions of good prospect" can be realized by taking track circuits as control units as described here. These units can be combined according to the track topology of the railway line to autonomously achieve the interlocking functions required of the entire track topology.
